4 their necks broken. In the United States, 8B10 million animals are killed every year for fur.
For all of these reasons, we may be said to suffer from a sort of moral schizophrenia when it comes to our thinking about animals. We claim to regard animals as having morally significant interests, but our behavior is to the contrary.
Animals as Things
Before the nineteenth century, the foregoing litany of animal uses would not have raised any concern. Western culture did not recognize that humans had any moral obligations to animals because animals did not matter morally at all. We could have moral obligations that concerned animals, but these obligations were really owed to other humans and not to animals. Animals were regarded as things, as having a moral status no different from that of inanimate objects.
As late as the seventeenth century, the view was advanced that animals are nothing more than machines. René Descartes (1596B1650), considered the founder of modern philosophy, argued that animals are not consciousCthey have no mind whatsoeverCbecause they do not possess a soul, which God invested only in humans. In support of the idea that animals lack consciousness, Descartes maintained that they do not use verbal or sign languageCsomething that every human being does but that no animal does. Descartes certainly recognized that animals act in what appear to be purposive and intelligent ways and that they seem to be conscious, but he claimed that they are really no different from machines made by God. Indeed, he likened animals to "automatons, or moving machines." 7 Moreover, just as a clock can tell time better than humans can, so some animal machines can perform some tasks better than humans can. Consciousness (1989) . There is, however, no doubt that Descartes regarded animals as morally indistinguishable from inanimate objects and, to the extent that he viewed animals as conscious and as having interests in not suffering, he ignored those interests.
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An obvious implication of Descartes=s position was that animals are not sentient; they are not conscious of pain, pleasure, or anything else. Descartes and his followers performed experiments in which they nailed animals by their paws to boards and cut them open to reveal their beating hearts. They burned, scalded, and mutilated animals in every conceivable manner. When the animals reacted as though they were suffering pain, Descartes dismissed the reaction as no different from the sound of a machine that is functioning improperly. A crying dog, Descartes maintained, is no different from a whining gear that needs oil.
In Descartes=s view, it is as senseless to talk about our moral obligations to animals, machines created by God, as it is to talk about our moral obligations to clocks, machines created by humans. We can have moral obligations that concern the clock, but any such obligations are really owed to other humans and not to the clock. If I smash the clock with a hammer, you may object because the clock belongs to you, or because I injure you when a piece of the clock accidentally strikes you, or because it is wasteful to destroy a perfectly good clock that could be used by someone else. I may be similarly obliged not to damage your dog, but the obligation is owed to you, not to the dog. The dog, like the clock, according to Descartes, is nothing more than a machine and possesses no interests in the first place.
There were others who did not share Descartes=s view that animals are merely machines but who still denied that we can have any moral obligations to animals. For example, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724B1804) recognized that animals are sentient and can suffer, but denied that we can have any direct moral obligations to them because, according to Kant, they are neither rational nor self-aware. According to Kant, animals are merely a means to human ends; they are "man=s instruments." They exist only for our use and have no value in themselves. To the extent that our treatment of animals matters at all for Kant, it does so only because of its impact on other humans: "[H]e who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men."
8 Kant argued that if we shoot and kill a faithful and obedient dog because the dog has grown old and is no longer capable of serving us, our act violates no obligation that we owe to the dog. The act is wrong only because of our moral obligation to reward the faithful service of other humans; killing the dog tends to make us less inclined to fulfill these human obligations. " [S] o far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties." Animals exist "merely as a means to an end. That end is man." 9 The view that we have no direct moral obligations to animals was also reflected in Anglo-American law. Before the nineteenth century, it is difficult to find any statutory recognition of legal obligations owed directly to animals. 10 To the extent that the law provided animals any protection, it was, for the most part, couched solely in terms of human concerns, primarily property interests. If Simon injured Jane=s cow, Simon=s act might violate a malicious mischief statute if it could be proved that the act manifested malice toward Jane. If Simon had malice toward the cow but not toward Jane, then he could not be prosecuted. It was irrelevant whether Simon=s malice was directed toward Jane=s cow or toward her inanimate property. Any judicial condemnation of animal cruelty was, with rare exceptions, expressed only as concern that such conduct would translate into cruelty to other humans, or that acts of cruelty to animals might offend public decency and cause a breach of the peace. That is, the law reflected the notion expressed by Kant and others that if there were any reason for us to be kind to animals, it had nothing to do with any obligation that we owed to animals, but only with our obligations to other humans.
Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics 240 (Louis Infield trans., Harper Torchbooks, 1963).
9. Id. at 239. There were others, such as Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and John Locke, who recognized that animals are sentient but who claimed that they lack characteristics such as rationality or abstract thought, and we could, therefore, treat them as things. See Francione, supra note 6, at 103B29. See also notes 74B97 and accompanying text.
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The Humane Treatment Principle: A Rejection of Animals as Things
Consider the following example. Simon proposes to torture a dog by burning the dog with a blowtorch. Simon=s only reason for torturing the dog is that he derives pleasure from this sort of activity. Does Simon=s proposal raise any moral concern? Is Simon violating some moral obligation not to use the animal in this way for his amusement? Or is Simon=s action morally no different from crushing and eating a walnut?
I think that most of us would not hesitate to maintain that blowtorching the dog simply for pleasure is not a morally justifiable act under any circumstances.
What is the basis of our moral judgment? Is it merely that we are concerned about the effect of Simon=s action on other humans? Do we object to the torture of the dog merely because it might upset other humans who like dogs? Do we object because by torturing the dog Simon may become a more callous or unkind person in his dealings with other humans? We may very well rest our moral objection to Simon=s action in part on our concern for the effect of his action on other humans, but that is not our primary reason for objecting. After all, we would condemn the act even if Simon tortures the animal in secret, or even if, apart from his appetite for torturing dogs, Simon is a charming fellow who shows only kindness to other humans.
Suppose that the dog is the companion animal of Simon=s neighbor, Jane.
Do we object to the torture because the dog is Jane=s property? We may very well object to Simon=s action because the dog belongs to Jane, but again, that is not our first concern. We would find Simon=s action objectionable even if the dog were a stray.
The primary reason that we find Simon=s action morally objectionable is its direct effect on the dog. The dog is sentient; like us, the dog is the sort of being who has the capacity to suffer and has an interest in not being blowtorched. 11 The 11. The neurological and physiological similarities between humans and nonhumans render the fact of animal sentience noncontroversial. Even mainstream science accepts that animals are sentient. For example, the U.S. Public Health Service states that " [u] nless the contrary is established, investigators should consider that procedures that cause pain or distress in human dog prefers, or wants, or desires not to be blowtorched. We have an obligationCone owed directly to the dog and not merely one that concerns the dogCnot to torture the dog. The sole ground for this obligation is that the dog is sentient; no other characteristic, such as humanlike rationality, reflective selfconsciousness, or the ability to communicate in a human language, is necessary.
We regard it as morally necessary to justify our infliction of harm on the dog simply because the dog can experience pain and suffering, We may disagree about whether a particular justification suffices, but we all agree that some justification is required, and Simon=s pleasure cannot constitute such a justification. An integral part of our moral thinking is the idea that, other things being equal, the fact that an action causes pain counts as a reason against that action, not merely because imposing harm on another sentient being somehow diminishes us, but because imposing harm on another sentient being is wrong in itself. And it does not matter whether Simon proposes to blowtorch for pleasure the dog or another animal, such as a cow. We would object to his conduct in either case.
In short, most of us claim to reject the characterization of animals as things that has dominated Western thinking for many centuries. For the better part of 200 years, Anglo-American moral and legal culture has made a distinction between sentient creatures and inanimate objects. Although we believe that we ought to prefer humans over animals when interests conflict, most of us accept as completely uncontroversial that our use and treatment of animals are guided by what we might call the humane treatment principle, or the view that because animals can suffer, we have a moral obligation that we owe directly to animals not to impose unnecessary suffering on them. argued that despite any differences, humans and animals are similar in that they both can suffer, and it is only the capacity to suffer and not the capacity for speech or reason or anything else that is required for animals to matter morally and to have legal protection. Bentham maintained that animals had been "degraded into the class of things," with the result that their interest in not suffering had been ignored. 12 In a statement as profound as it was simple, 16. Protection of Animals Act, 1911, ch. 27 ' 1(1)(a) (Eng.). British legislation prohibiting cruelty to animals was passed as early as 1822.
The American Humane Slaughter Act, originally enacted in 1958, regulates the killing of animals used for food.
20
As we saw earlier, if Simon injured Jane=s cow, malicious mischief statutes required a showing that Simon bore malice toward Jane. To the extent that courts had any concern about cruelty to animals, this concern was limited to the effect that cruelty might have on public sensibilities or on the tendency of cruelty to animals to encourage cruelty to other humans. The passage of anticruelty laws allowed for Simon=s prosecution even if he bore Jane no ill will and instead intended malice only to her cow. Moreover, these laws reflect concern about the moral significance of animal suffering, in addition to the detrimental repercussions of cruelty to animals for humans. Anticruelty laws are often explicit in applying to all animals, whether owned or unowned. Thus, whereas malicious mischief statutes were "intended to protect the beasts as property instead of as creatures susceptible of suffering," anticruelty statutes are "designed for the protection of animals."
21 They are intended "for the benefit of animals, as death inflicted on these billions of farm animals is that we enjoy the taste of their flesh.
Although many regard the use of animals in experiments as involving a genuine conflict of human and animal interests, the necessity of animal use for this purpose is open to serious question as well. Considerable empirical evidence challenges the notion that animal experiments are necessary to ensure human health and indicates that, in many instances, reliance on animal models has actually been counterproductive.
Animals as Property: An Unbalanced Balance
The profound inconsistency between what we say about animals and how we actually treat them is related to the status of animals as our property. 29 Animals are commodities that we own and that have no value other than that which we, as property owners, choose to give them. Although Bentham changed moral thinking and legal doctrine by introducing the idea that sentience is the only characteristic required for animals to matter, neither he nor the reformers interested in incorporating his views into law ever questioned the property status of animals.
30
Under the law, "animals are owned in the same way as inanimate objects such as cars and furniture." 31 They "are by law treated as any other form of movable property and may be the subject of absolute, i.e., complete ownership . . . [and] the owner has at his command all the protection that the law provides in respect of absolute ownership." 32 The owner is entitled to exclusive physical possession of 29 . See generally Francione, supra note 10 (discussing the status of animals as property as a general matter, and in the context of anticruelty laws and the federal Animal Welfare Act). The status of animals as property has existed for thousands of years. Indeed, historical evidence indicates that the domestication of animals is closely related to the development of the concepts of property and money. The property status of animals is particularly important in Western culture for two reasons. First, property rights are accorded a special status and are considered to be among the most important rights we have. Second, the modern Western concept of property, whereby resources are regarded as separate objects that are assigned and belong to particular individuals who are allowed to use the property to the exclusion of everyone else, has its origin in God=s grant to humans of dominion over animals. See id. at 24B49; Francione, supra note 6, at 50B54. property interest will almost always prevail. The animal in question is always a "pet" or a "laboratory animal," or a "game animal," or a "food animal," or a "rodeo animal," or some other form of animal property that exists solely for our use and has no value except that which we give it. There is really no choice to be made between the human and the animal interest because the choice has already been predetermined by the property status of the animal; the "suffering" of property owners who cannot use their property as they wish counts more than animal suffering. We are allowed to impose any suffering required to use our animal property for a particular purpose even if that purpose is our mere amusement or pleasure. As long as we use our animal property to generate an economic benefit, there is no effective limit on our use or treatment of animals.
33
There are several specific ways in which animal welfare laws ensure that there will never be a meaningful balance of human and animal interests. First, many of these laws explicitly exempt most forms of institutionalized property use, which account for the largest number of animals that we use. The most frequent exemptions from state anticruelty statutes involve scientific experiments, agricultural practices, and hunting. 34 The Animal Welfare Act, the primary federal law that regulates the use of animals in biomedical experiments, does not even apply to most of the animals used in experimentsCrats and miceCand imposes no meaningful limits on the amount of pain and suffering that may be inflicted on animals in the conduct of experiments.
35
Second, even if anticruelty statutes do not do so explicitly, courts have effectively exempted our common uses of animals from scrutiny by interpreting these statutes as not prohibiting the infliction of even extreme suffering if it is incidental to an accepted use of animals and a customary practice on the part of animal owners. 36 An act "which inflicts pain, even the great pain of mutilation, and which is cruel in the ordinary sense of the word" is not prohibited "[w]henever the purpose for which the act is done is to make the animal more serviceable for the use of man." 37 For example, courts have held consistently that animals used for food may be mutilated in ways that unquestionably cause severe pain and suffering and that would normally be regarded as cruel or even as torture. These practices are permitted, however, because animal agriculture is an accepted institutionalized animal use, and those in the meat industry regard the 33. To the extent that animal uses, such as certain types of animal fighting, have been prohibited, this may be understood more in terms of class hierarchy and cultural prejudice than in terms of moral concern about animals. See Francione, supra note 10, at 18. Regalado appealed, claiming that he did not intend to harm the puppy and inflicted the beating only for disciplinary purposes. The court held that anticruelty statutes were "not intended to place unreasonable restrictions on the infliction of such pain as may be necessary for the training or discipline of an animal" and that 38 . See Francione, supra note 10, at 127B28; Francione, supra note 6, at 66B67. This presumption not only insulates customary practices from being found to violate anticruelty laws, but also militates against finding the necessary criminal intent in cases involving noncustomary uses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barr, 44 Pa. C. 284 (Lancaster County Ct. 1916). See infra notes 40B43 and accompanying text.
39. 16 L.R.Ir. 325, 335 (C.P.D. 1885) (Murphy, J.). In Britain, the dehorning of older cattle was found to violate the anticruelty statute but only because dehorning had been discontinued and was no longer an accepted agriculture practice. See Ford v. Wiley, 23 Q.B. 203 (1889). In his opinion, Hawkins, J., noted that the fact that the practice had been abandoned by farmers who were acting in their economic self-interest was proof that the practice was unnecessary. See id. at 221B22.
40. See Francione, supra note 10, at 135B39; Francione, supra note 6, at 63B66. the statute only prohibited acts done with malice or a cruel disposition. 42 Although the court affirmed Regalado=s conviction, it recognized that "proof of malice will usually be circumstantial, and the line between discipline and cruelty will often be difficult to draw." 43 Fourth, many animal welfare laws have wholly inadequate penalty provisions, and we are reluctant, in any event, to impose the stigma of criminal liability on animal owners for what they do with their property. 44 Moreover, those without an ownership interest generally do not have standing to bring legal challenges to the use or treatment of animals by their owners.
45
As the foregoing makes clear, because animals are property, we do not balance interests to determine whether it is necessary to use animals at all for particular purposes. We simply assume that it is appropriate to use animals for food, recreation, entertainment, clothing, or experimentsCthe primary ways in which we use animals as commodities to generate social wealth and most of which cannot be described plausibly as involving any genuine conflict of human and animal interests. Animal welfare laws do not even apply to many of these uses. To the extent that we do ask whether the imposition of pain and suffering is necessary, the inquiry is limited to whether particular treatment is in compliance with the customs and practices of property owners who, we assume, will not inflict more pain and suffering on their animal property than is required for the purpose. The only way to characterize this process is as a "balancing" of the property owner=s interest in using animal property against the interest of an animal in not being used in ways that fail to comply with those customs and practices. Although animal welfare laws are intended to protect the interests of 42 . Id. at 420.
43.
Id. at 421.
44. See Francione, supra note 10, at 156; Francione, supra note 6, at 67B68. In recent years, many states have amended their anticruelty laws and have increased penalties for at least certain violations. It remains to be seen whether this will make any real difference because most animal uses will remain exempt and there will still be problems with proof of criminal intent.
45. See Francione, supra note 10, at 65B90, 156B58; Francione, supra note 6, at 69B70.
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art21 animals without reference to their being property, animal interests are protected only insofar as they serve the goal of rational property use. 46 Our infliction of suffering on animals raises a legal question only when it does not conform to the customs and practices of those institutionsCwhen we intentionally inflict suffering in ways that do not maximize social wealth, or when the only explanation for the behavior can be characterized as "the gratification of convicted of cruelty to animals when police found dozens of cows and pigs dead or dying from malnutrition and dehydration on his farm. Schott=s defense was that bad weather prevented him from caring for his livestock. The jury found Schott guilty of cruelty and neglect, and the appellate court affirmed. These are, however, unusual cases and constitute a minuscule fraction of the instances in which we inflict suffering on animals.
Moreover, the very same act may be either protected or prohibited depending only on whether it is part of an accepted institution of animal exploitation. If someone kills a cat in a microwave, sets a dog on fire, allows the body temperature of a rabbit to rise to the point of heat stroke, severs the heads of conscious animals, or allows animals to suffer untreated serious illnesses, the conduct may violate the anticruelty laws. But if a researcher engages in the exact same conduct as part of an experiment (and a number of researchers have killed animals or inflicted pain on them in the same and similar ways) the conduct is protected by the law because the researcher is supposedly using the animal to generate a benefit. A farmer may run afoul of the anticruelty law if she neglects her animals and allows them to suffer from malnutrition or dehydration for no reason, but she may mutilate her animals and raise them in conditions of severe confinement and deprivation, if she intends to sell them for food. The permitted actions cause as much if not more distress to animals as does neglecting them, but they are considered part of normal animal husbandry and are, therefore, protected under the law.
Thus, because animals are our property, the law will require their interests to be observed only to the extent that it facilitates their exploitation. This observation holds true even in countries where there is arguably a greater moral concern about animals. Britain, for instance, has more restrictions on animal use than does the United States, but the differences in permitted animal treatment are more formal than substantive. In discussing British animal welfare laws, one commentator has noted that Amuch of the animal welfare agenda has been obstructed and it is difficult to think of legislation improving the welfare of animals that has seriously damaged the interests of the animal users." 55 The law may in theory impose regulations that go beyond the minimum level of care required to exploit animals, yet it has rarely done so, for there are significant economic and other obstacles involved. 56 Voluntary changes in industry standards of animal welfare generally occur only when animal users regard these changes as cost-effective.
57
The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we reject the status of animals as things. We treat animals as the moral equivalent of inanimate objects with no morally significant interests. Movement (1996) [hereinafter, Francione, Rain Without Thunder] (discussing unsuccessful efforts by the animal protection movement to obtain animal welfare laws that exceed the minimal standards required to exploit animals).
57. For example, McDonald=s, the fast-food chain, announced that it would require its suppliers to observe standards of animal welfare that went beyond current standards: "Animal welfare is also an important part of quality assurance. For high-quality food products at the counter, you need high quality coming from the farm. Animals that are well cared for are less prone to illness, injury, and stress, which all have the same negative impact on the condition of livestock as they do on people. Proper animal welfare practices also benefit producers. Complying with our animal welfare guidelines helps ensure efficient production and reduces waste and loss. This enables our suppliers to be highly competitive. 
Taking Animal Interests Seriously: The Principle of Equal Consideration
We claim to accept that animals are not merely things. We may use animals when there is a conflict between human and animal interests that requires us to make a choice, but we have a moral obligation that we owe directly to animals not to inflict unnecessary suffering on them. Despite what we say, most of our animal use cannot be described as involving any conflict of interests, and we inflict extreme pain and suffering on animals in the process. Even if we treated animals better, that would still leave open the question of our moral justification for imposing any suffering at all if animal use is not necessary. We may, of course, decide to discard the humane treatment principle and acknowledge that we regard animals as nothing more than things without any morally significant interests.
This option would at least spare us the need for thinking about our moral obligations to animals. We would not have any.
Alternatively, if we are to make good on our claim to take animal interests seriously, then we can do so in only one way: by applying the principle of equal considerationCthe rule that we ought to treat like cases alike unless there is a good reason not to do soCto animals. 58 The principle of equal consideration is a necessary component of every moral theory. Any theory that maintains that it is permissible to treat similar cases in a dissimilar way would fail to qualify as an acceptable moral theory for that reason alone. Although there may be many differences between humans and animals, there is at least one important similarity that we all already recognize: our shared capacity to suffer. In this sense, humans and animals are similar to each other and different from everything else in the universe that is not sentient. If our supposed prohibition on the infliction of unnecessary suffering on animals is to have any meaning at all, then we must give equal consideration to animal interests in not suffering.
The suggestion that animal interests should receive equal consideration is not as radical as it may appear at first if we consider that the humane treatment 58 . See Francione, supra note 6, at 81B102. A reason not to treat similar cases in a similar way must not be arbitrary and thereby itself violate the principle of equal consideration.
principle incorporates the principle of equal consideration. We are to weigh our suffering in not using animals against animal interests in avoiding suffering. If there is a conflict between human and animal interests and the human interest weighs more, then the animal suffering is justifiable. If there is no conflict, or if there is a conflict of interests but the animal interest weighs more, then we are not justified in using the animal. And if there is a conflict of interests but the interests at stake are similar, then we should presumably treat those interests in the same way and impose suffering on neither or both unless there is some nonarbitrary always a good reason not to accord similar treatment unless to do so would benefit property owners. Animal interests will almost always count for less than one; animals remain as they were before the nineteenth centuryCthings without morally significant interests.
The application of the principle of equal consideration similarly failed in the context of North American slavery, which allowed some humans to treat others as property. 61 The institution of human slavery was structurally identical to the institution of animal ownership. Because a human slave was regarded as property, the slave owner was able to disregard all of the slave=s interests if it was economically beneficial to do so, and the law generally deferred to the slave owner=s judgment as to the value of the slave. As chattel property, slaves could be sold, willed, insured, mortgaged, and seized in payment of the owner=s debts.
Slave owners could inflict severe punishments on slaves for virtually any reason.
Those who intentionally or negligently injured another=s slave were liable to the owner in an action for damage to property. Slaves could not enter into contracts, own property, sue or be sued, or live as free persons with basic rights and duties.
It was generally acknowledged that slaves had an interest in not suffering: same as for the murder of a free person, but this law "did not apply to an outlawed slave, nor to a slave 'in the act of resistance to his lawful owner,' nor to a slave 'dying under moderate correction.'" 63 A law that prohibits the murder of slaves but permits three general and easily satisfied exceptions, combined with a general prohibition against the testimony of slaves against free persons, cannot effectively deter the murder of slaves. That the law refused to protect the interests of slaves against slave owners is underscored in State v. Mann, in which the court held that even the "cruel and unreasonable battery" of one=s own slave is not indictable:
Courts cannot "allow the right of the master to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice. The slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is no appeal from his master." 64 To the extent that the law regulated the conduct of slave owners, it had nothing to do with concern for the interests of the slaves. For example, in Commonwealth v. Turner, the court determined that it had no jurisdiction to try the defendant slave owner, who beat his slave with "rods, whips and sticks," and held that even if the beating was administered "wilfully and maliciously, violently, cruelly, immoderately, and excessively," the court was not empowered to act as long as the slave did not die. 65 The court distinguished private beatings from public chastisement; the latter might subject the master to liability "not because it was a slave who was beaten, nor because the act was unprovoked or cruel; but, because ipso facto it disturbed the harmony of society; was offensive to public decency, and directly tended to a breach of the peace. The same would be the law, if a horse had been so beaten." owner=s property interest in the slave always trumped any interest of the slave who was ostensibly protected under the law. The interests of slaves were observed only when it provided an economic benefit for the owners or served their whim.
Alan Watson has noted that "[a]t most places at most times a reasonably economic owner would be conscious of the chattel value of slaves and thus would ensure some care in their treatment." 67 Any legal limitations on the cruelty of slave owners reflected the concern that they should not use their property in unproductive ways; as expressed by the Roman jurist Justinian, "'it is to the advantage of the state that no one use his property badly.'" 68 Although some slave owners were more "humane" than others and some even treated slaves as family members, any kind treatment was a matter of the master=s charity and not of the slave=s right, and slavery as a legal institution had the inevitable effect of treating humans as nothing more than commodities. The principle of equal consideration had no meaningful application to the interests of a human whose only value was as a resource belonging to others. Slaves were rarely considered to have any interests similar to slave owners or other free persons; in those instances in which interests were recognized as similar, the property status of the slave was always a good reason not to accord similar treatment unless to do so would benefit the owner.
We eventually recognized that if humans were to have any morally significant interests, they could not be the resources of others and that race was not a sufficient reason to treat certain humans as property. 69 69. Even after the abolition of slavery, race continued to serve as a reason to justify differential treatment, often on the ground that whites and people of color did not have similar interests and, therefore, did not have to be treated equally in certain respects, and often on the ground that race was a reason to deny similar treatment to admittedly similar interests. But abolition recognized that, irrespective of race, all humans had a similar interest in not being treated as the property of others. their particular characteristics, as the property of others. Indeed, in a world deeply divided on many moral issues, one of the few norms steadfastly endorsed by the international community is the prohibition of human slavery. It matters not whether the particular form of slavery is "humane" or not; we condemn all human slavery. More brutal forms of slavery are worse than less brutal forms, but we prohibit human slavery in general because all forms of slavery more or less allow the interests of slaves to be ignored if it provides a benefit to slave owners, and humans have an interest in not suffering the deprivation of their fundamental interests merely because it benefits someone else, however "humanely" they are treated. It would, of course, be incorrect to say that human slavery has been eliminated from the planet. But the peremptory norms in international lawCthose few, select rules regarded as of such significance that they admit of no derogation by any nationCinclude the prohibition of slavery, which humanity deems so odious that no civilized nation can bear its existence.
The interest of a human in not being the property of others is protected by a right. When an interest is protected by a right, the interest may not be ignored or violated simply because it will benefit others. Rights are "moral notions that grow out of respect for the individual. They build protective fences around the individual. They establish areas where the individual is entitled to be protected against the state and the majority even where a price is paid by the general welfare." 70 If we are going to recognize and protect the interest of humans in not being treated as property, then we must use a right to do so; if we do not, then those humans who do not have this protection will be treated merely as commodities whenever it will benefit others. Therefore, the interest in not being treated as property must be protected against being traded away even if a price is paid by the general welfare. The right not to be treated as the property of others is basic and different from any other rights we might have because it is the grounding for those other rights; it is a prelegal right that serves as the precondition for the possession of morally significant interests. The basic right is the right to the equal consideration of one=s fundamental interests; it recognizes that if some humans have value only as resources, then the principle of equal consideration will have no meaningful application to their interests. Therefore, the basic right must be understood as prohibiting human slavery, or any other institutional arrangement that treats humans exclusively as means to the ends of others and not as ends in themselves. 71 The protection afforded by the basic right not to treated as property is limited. The basic right does not guarantee equal treatment in all respects nor protect humans from all suffering, but it protects all humans, irrespective of their particular characteristics, from suffering any deprivation of interests as the result of being used exclusively as the resources of others and thereby provides essential protections. We may not enslave humans nor, for that matter, may we exert total control over their bodies by using them as we do laboratory animals, or as forced organ donors, or as raw materials for shoes, or as objects to be hunted for sport or torturedCirrespective of whether we claim to treat them "humanely" in the 71. Similar concepts have been recognized by philosophers and political theorists. Kant, for example, maintained that there is one "innate" rightCthe right of "innate equality," or the "independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being=s quality of being his own master." Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, '' 6:237B38, at 30 (Mary Gregor trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996). This innate right "grounds our right to have rights." Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant=s Moral Theory 248 (1989). The basic right not to be treated as property is different from what are referred to as natural rights insofar as these are understood to be rights that exist apart from their recognition by any particular legal system because they are granted by God. For example, John Locke regarded property rights as natural rights that were grounded in God=s grant to humans of dominion over the earth and animals. The basic right not to be treated as property expresses a proposition of logic. If human interests are to have moral significance (i.e., if human interests are to be treated in accordance with the principle of equal consideration), then humans cannot be the property of other humans. For a further discussion of this basic right and the related concept of inherent value, see Francione, supra note 6, at 92B100. See also Henry Shue, Basic Rights (2d ed. 1996). Animal ownership as a legal institution inevitably has the effect of treating animals as commodities. Moreover, animals, like humans, have an interest in not suffering at all from the ways in which we use them, however "humane" that use may be. To the extent that we protect humans from being used in these ways and we do not extend the same protection to animals, we fail to accord equal consideration to animal interests in not suffering.
72. Human experimentation is prohibited by the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration. Torture is prohibited by the International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The notable exception to the protection provided by the basic right is compulsory military service, which is controversial precisely because it does treat humans exclusively as means to the ends of others in ways that other acts required by the government, such as the payment of taxes, do not.
73. See Francione, supra note 6, at 94, 131B33. See also supra note 71; infra note 78 and accompanying text.
If we are going to take animal interests seriously, we must extend to animals the one right that we extend to all humans irrespective of their particular characteristics. To do so would not mean that animals would be protected from all suffering. Animals in the wild may be injured, or become diseased, or may be attacked by other animals. But it would mean that animals could no longer be used as the resources of humans and would, therefore, be protected from suffering at all from such uses. Is there a morally sound reason not to extend to animals the right not to be treated as property, and thereby recognize that our obligation not to impose unnecessary suffering on them is really an obligation not to treat them as property? Or, to ask the question in another way, why do we deem it acceptable to eat animals, hunt them, confine and display them in circuses and zoos, use them in experiments or rodeos, or otherwise to treat them in ways in which we would never think it appropriate to treat any human irrespective of how "humanely" we were to do so?
The usual response claims that some empirical difference between humans and animals constitutes a good reason for not according to animals the one right we accord to all humans. According to this view, there is some qualitative distinction between humans and animals (all species considered as a single group) that purportedly justifies our treating animals as our property. This distinction almost always concerns some difference between human and animal minds; we have some mental characteristic that animals lack, or are capable of certain actions of which animals are incapable as a result of our purportedly superior cognitive abilities. The list of characteristics that are posited as possessed only by humans includes self-consciousness, reason, abstract thought, emotion, the ability to communicate, and the capacity for moral action. 74 We claimed to reject the 74. Some claim that the relevant difference between humans and nonhumans is that the former possess souls and the latter do not. For a discussion of this and other purported differences, see Francione, supra note 6, at 103B29. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. I do not mean to suggest that everyone after 1800 who has relied on these differences to justify our treatment of animals as resources acknowledges that animals have any morally significant interests; indeed, some accept and defend the status of animals as things morally indistinguishable from inanimate objects. See, e.g., Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice (1992).
relevance of these characteristics 200 years ago when we supposedly embraced the idea that the capacity to suffer was the only attribute needed to ground our moral obligation to animals not to impose unnecessary suffering on them. Yet, the absence of these same characteristics continues to serve as our justification for treating animals as our resources and has been used to keep animals "degraded into the class of things" despite our claim to take animal interests seriously. 78. I recognize that most Bentham scholars regard Bentham=s objections to slavery to be based exclusively on the consequences of slavery and claim that Bentham did not think that slavery violated any moral right. It appears, however, that Bentham, who is generally regarded as an act utilitarian, was at the very least a rule utilitarian when it came to slavery; that is, he thought that the consequences of the institution of slavery were necessarily undesirable and, in effect, he recognized that the human interest in not being treated as a resource should be accorded rightstype protection. Moreover, Bentham did talk in terms of moral rights when he discussed human slavery and the treatment of animals, see id., although he was probably referring to the right to equal consideration in that passage. Bentham may well have recognized on some level that a right to equal consideration is inconsistent with the status of being a slave. See Francione, supra note 6, at 132B33. we should be suffered to eat such of them as we like to eat: we are the better for it, and they are never the worse. They have none of those long-protracted anticipations of future misery which we have." 80 Although Bentham explicitly rejected the position that, because animals lack characteristics beyond sentience, such as self-awareness, we could treat them as things, he maintained that because animals lack this characteristic, we do not violate the principle of equal consideration by using animals as our resources as long as we give equal consideration to their interests in not suffering.
Bentham=s position is problematic for several reasons. Bentham failed to recognize that although particular animal owners might treat their animal property kindly, institutionalized animal exploitation would, like slavery, become "the lot of large numbers," and animals would necessarily be treated as economic commodities that were, like slaves, "abandoned without redress to the caprice of a 79. Bentham, supra note 12, at 282B83 n.b.
80.
Id. Bentham also claimed that "[t]he death [that animals] suffer in our hands commonly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the inevitable course of nature." Id. Bentham ignored the fact that the domestic animals that we raise for food would not have a death "in the inevitable course of nature," because they are only brought into existence as our resources in the first place. It is, therefore, problematic to defend the killing of domestic animals by comparing their deaths with those of wild animals, saying that the infliction of unnecessary pain on domestic animals that we do not need to eat is less than the pain that may necessarily be suffered by wild animals.
tormentor." Moreover, Bentham never explained how to apply the principle of equal consideration to animals who were the property of humans. 81 But most important, Bentham was simply wrong to claim that animals are not self-aware and have no interest in their lives.
Sentience is not an end in itself. It is a means to the end of staying alive.
Sentient beings use sensations of pain and suffering to escape situations that threaten their lives and sensations of pleasure to pursue situations that enhance their lives. Just as humans will often endure excruciating pain in order to remain alive, animals will often not only endure but inflict on themselves excruciating painCas when gnawing off a paw caught in a trapCin order to live. Sentience is what evolution has produced in order to ensure the survival of certain complex organisms. To claim that a being who has evolved to develop a consciousness of 81. Peter Singer, who, like Bentham, is a utilitarian and eschews moral rights, adopts Bentham=s position and argues that most animals do not have an interest in their lives, but that the principle of equal consideration can nevertheless be applied to their interests in not suffering even if animals are the property of humans. Singer=s argument fails in a number of respects. First, Singer requires that we make interspecies comparisons of pain and suffering in order to apply the principle of equal consideration to animal interests. See Singer, supra note 59, at 15. Such comparisons are inherently difficult (if not impossible) to make. Second, because most humans are self-aware and most animals are not (in Singer=s view), it is difficult to understand how animals and humans will ever be considered as similarly situated for purposes of equal consideration. Singer recognizes that because we are unlikely to regard human and animal interests as similar in the first place, we are also unlikely to find any guidance in the principle of equal consideration. Id. at 16. That is, however, tantamount to admitting that animal interests are not morally significant because the principle of equal consideration will never have any meaningful application to animal interests. Singer avoids this conclusion by claiming that even if the principle of equal consideration is inapplicable, it is still clear that much animal suffering is not morally justifiable. He states, for example, that we need not apply the principle of equal consideration in order to conclude that the positive consequences for animals of abolishing intensive agriculture would be greater than any detrimental consequences for humans. It remains unclear how Singer can arrive at this conclusion other than through mere stipulation. The abolition of intensive agriculture would have a profound impact on the international economy and would cause an enormous rise in the price of meat and animal products. If the issue hinges only on consequences, it is not at all clear that the consequences for self-aware humans would not be weightier than the consequences for non-self-aware animals. Fourth, even if Singer=s theory would lead to more "humane" animal treatment, it would still permit us to use animals as resources in ways that we do not use any humans. Singer=s response to this would be that he would be willing to use similarly situated humans, such as the mentally or physically disabled, as replaceable resources. Id.; see also Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 186 (2d ed. 1993). For the reasons discussed below, most of us would reject Singer=s views on the use of vulnerable humans. See infra notes 95B97 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Singer=s views, see Francione, supra note 6, at 135B48; Francione, Rain Without Thunder, supra note 56, at 156B60, 173B76.
pain and pleasure has no interest in remaining alive is to say that conscious beings have no interest in remaining conscious, a most peculiar position to take.
Moreover, the proposition that humans have mental characteristics wholly absent in animals is inconsistent with the theory of evolution. Darwin maintained that there are no uniquely human characteristics: "[T]he difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind." 82 Animals are able to think, and possess many of the same emotional responses as do humans: "[T]he senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a welldeveloped condition, in the lower animals." 83 Darwin noted that "associated animals have a feeling of love for each other" and that animals "certainly sympathise with each other=s distress or danger."
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Even if we cannot know the precise nature of animal self-awareness, it appears that any being that is aware on a perceptual level must be self-aware and have a continuous mental existence. Biologist Donald Griffin has observed that if animals are conscious of anything, "the animal=s own body and its own actions must fall within the scope of its perceptual consciousness." 85 Yet we deny animals self-awareness because we maintain that they cannot "think such thoughts as 'It is I who am running, or climbing this tree, or chasing that moth.'" 86 Griffin maintains that "when an animal consciously perceives the running, climbing, or moth-chasing of another animal, it must also be aware of who is doing these things. And if the animal is perceptually conscious of its own body, it is difficult to rule out similar recognition that it, itself, is doing the running, climbing, or chasing." 87 Griffin concludes that "[i]f animals are capable of perceptual awareness, denying them some level of self-awareness would seem to be an arbitrary and unjustified restriction." 88 Griffin=s reasoning can be applied in the context of sentience. Any sentient being must have some level of self-awareness.
To be sentient means to be the sort of being who recognizes that it is that being, and not some other, who is experiencing pain or distress. When a dog experiences pain, the dog necessarily has a mental experience that tells her "this pain is happening to me." In order for pain to exist, some consciousnessCsomeoneCmust perceive it as happening to her and must prefer not to experience it. There are problems in relying on similarities between humans and animals beyond sentience to justify the moral significance of animals. See Francione, supra note 6, at 116B19. For example, a focus on similarities beyond sentience threatens to create new hierarchies in which we move some animals, such as the great apes or dolphins, into a preferred group, and continue to treat other animals as our resources. There has for some years been an international effort to secure certain rights for the nonhuman great apes. This project was started by the publication of a book entitled The Great Ape Project (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993), which seeks "the extension of the community of equals to include all great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans." Id. at 4. I was a contributor to The Great Ape Project. See Gary L. Francione, APersonhood, Property, and Legal Competence," in id. at 248B57. The danger of The Great Ape Project is that it reinforces the notion that characteristics beyond sentience are necessary and not merely sufficient for equal treatment. In my essay in The Great Ape Project, I tried to avoid this problem by arguing that although the considerable cognitive and other similarities between the human and nonhuman great apes are sufficient to accord the latter equal protection under the law, these similarities are not necessary for animals to have a right not to be treated as resources. ability to recognize oneself in a mirror or use symbolic language better in a moral sense than the ability to fly or breathe underwater? The answer, of course, is that we say so. But apart from our proclamation, there is simply no reason to conclude that characteristics thought to be uniquely human have any value that allows us to use them as a nonarbitrary justification for treating animals as property. These characteristics can serve this role only after we have assumed their moral relevance.
Second, even if all animals other than humans lack a particular characteristic beyond sentience, or possess it to a different degree than do humans, there is no logically defensible relationship between the lack or lesser degree of that characteristic and our treatment of animals as resources.
Differences between humans and other animals may be relevant for other purposesCno sensible person argues that we ought to enable nonhuman animals to drive cars or vote or attend universitiesCbut the differences have no bearing on whether animals should have the status of property. We recognize this inescapable conclusion where humans are involved. Whatever characteristic we identify as uniquely human will be seen to a lesser degree in some humans and not at all in others.
95 Some humans will have the exact same deficiency that we attribute to animals, and although the deficiency may be relevant for some purposes, most of us would reject enslaving such humans, or otherwise treating such humans exclusively as means to the ends of others.
Consider, for instance, self-consciousness. Peter Carruthers defines selfconsciousness as the ability to have a "conscious experience . . . whose existence and content are available to be consciously thought about (that is, available for description in acts of thinking that are themselves made available to further acts 95 . Some argue that although certain humans may lack a particular characteristic, the fact that all humans have the potential to possess the characteristic means that a human who actually lacks it is for purposes of equal consideration distinguishable from an animal who may also lack it. See, e.g., Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research," 315 New Eng. J. Med. 865 (1986) . This argument begs the question because it assumes that some humans have a characteristic that they lack and thereby ignores the factual similarity between animals and humans who lack the characteristic. Moreover, in some instances, animals may possess the characteristic to a greater degree than do some humans. treating her differently in some respectsCit may be relevant to whether we make her the host of a talk show, or give her a job teaching in a university, or allow her to drive a carCbut it has no relevance to whether we treat her exclusively as a resource and disregard her fundamental interests, including her interest in not suffering and in her continued existence, if it benefits us to do so.
The same analysis applies to every human characteristic beyond sentience that is offered to justify treating animals as resources. There will be some humans who also lack this characteristic, or possess it to a lesser degree than do normal humans. This "defect" may be relevant for some purposes, but not for whether we treat humans exclusively as resources. We do not treat as things those humans 96. Carruthers, supra note 74, at 181. Peter Singer also requires this sort of selfconsciousness before animals or humans can be considered to have an interest in their lives. See Singer, supra note 59, at 228B29. See also supra note 81. who lack characteristics beyond sentience simply out of some sense of charity.
We realize that to do so would violate the principle of equal consideration by using an arbitrary reason to deny similar treatment to similar interests in not being treated exclusively as a means to the ends of others.
97 "[T]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk ? but, Can they suffer?"
In sum, there is no characteristic that serves to distinguish humans from all other animals for purposes of denying to animals the one right that we extend to all humans. Whatever attribute we may think makes all humans special and thereby deserving of the right not to be the property of others is shared by nonhumans. More important, even if there are uniquely human characteristics, some humans will not possess those characteristics, but we would never think of using such humans as resources. In the end, the only difference between humans and animals is species, and species is not a justification for treating animals as property any more than is race a justification for human slavery.
Animals as "Persons"
If we extend the right not to be property to animals, then animals will become moral persons. To say that a being is a person is merely to say that the being has morally significant interests, that the principle of equal consideration applies to that being, that the being is not a thing. In a sense, we already accept that animals are persons; we claim to reject the view that animals are things and to recognize that, at the very least, animals have a morally significant interest in not suffering.
Their status as property, however, has prevented their personhood from being realized.
The same was true of human slavery. Slaves were regarded as chattel property. Laws that provided for the Ahumane" treatment of slaves did not make slaves persons because, as we have seen, the principle of equal consideration 97. In this sense, the equality of all humans is predicated on factual similarities shared by all humans irrespective of their particular characteristics beyond sentience. All humans have an interest in not being treated exclusively as means to the ends of others. All humans value themselves even if no one else values them. See Francione, supra note 6, at 128, 135 n.18. Moreover, justice (not charity) may require that we be especially conscientious about protecting humans who lack certain characteristics precisely because of their vulnerability.
could not apply to slaves. We tried, through slave welfare laws, to have a threetiered system: things, or inanimate property; persons, who were free; and in the middle, depending on your choice of locution, "quasi-persons" or "things plus"Cthe slaves. That system could not work. We eventually recognized that if slaves were going to have morally significant interests, they could not be slaves any more, for the moral universe is limited to only two kinds of beings: persons and things. "Quasi-persons" or "things plus" will necessarily risk being treated as things because the principle of equal consideration cannot apply to them.
Nor can we use animal welfare laws to render animals "quasi-persons" or "things plus." They are either persons, beings to whom the principle of equal consideration applies and who possess morally significant interests in not suffering, or things, beings to whom the principle of equal consideration does not apply and whose interests may be ignored if it benefits us. There is no third choice. We could, of course, treat animals better than we do; there are, however, powerful economic forces that militate against better treatment in light of the status of animals as property. But simply according better treatment to animals would not mean that they were no longer things. It may have been better to beat slaves three rather than five times a week, but this better treatment would not have removed slaves from the category of things. The similar interests of slave owners and slaves were not accorded similar treatment because the former had a right not to suffer at all from being used exclusively as a resource, and the latter did not possess such a right. Animals, like humans, have an interest in not suffering at all from the ways in which we use them, however "humane" that use may be. To the extent that we protect humans from suffering from these uses and we do not extend the same protection to animals, we fail to accord equal consideration to animal interests in not suffering.
If animals are persons, that does not mean that they are human persons; it does not mean that we must treat animals in the same way that we treat humans or that we must extend to animals any of the legal rights that we reserve to competent humans. Nor does this mean that animals have any sort of guarantee of a life free from suffering, or that we must protect animals from harm from other animals in the wild or from accidental injury by humans. As I argue below, it does not necessarily preclude our choosing human interests over animal interests in situations of genuine conflict. But it does require that we accept that we have a moral obligation to stop using animals for food, entertainment, or clothing, or any other uses that assume that animals are merely resources, and that we ultimately prohibit the ownership of animals. We should, of course, care for those domestic animals presently in existence, but we should stop producing animals for human purposes. The abolition of animal slavery is required by any moral theory that purports to treat animal interests as morally significant, even if the particular theory otherwise rejects rights, just as the abolition of human slavery is required by any theory that purports to treat human interests as morally significant.
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False Conflicts
The question of the moral status of animals addresses the matter of how we ought to treat animals in situations of conflict between human and animal interests. For the most part, our conflicts with animals are those that we create. We bring billions of sentient animals into existence for the sole purpose of killing them. We then seek to understand the nature of our moral obligations to these animals. Yet by bringing animals into existence for uses that we would never consider appropriate for any humans, we have already placed nonhuman animals outside the scope of our moral community altogether. Despite what we say about taking 98 . See supra notes 73, 78 and accompanying text; Francione, supra note 6, at 148. The theory presented in this essay is different in significant respects from that of Tom Regan. See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (1983) . Regan argues that animals have rights and that animal exploitation ought to be abolished and not merely regulated, but he limits protection to those animals who have preference autonomy, and he thereby omits from the class of rights holders those animals who are sentient but who do not have preference autonomy. The theory discussed in this essay applies to any sentient being. Regan uses the concept of basic rights and although he does not discuss the status of animals as property or the basic right not to be property, he maintains that some animals should be accorded the right not to be treated exclusively as means to human ends. Moreover, Regan does not acknowledge that this basic right can be derived solely from applying the principle of equal consideration to animal interests in not suffering, nor that the right must be part of any theory that purports to accord moral significance to animal interests even if that theory otherwise rejects rights. For a further discussion of the differences between my theory and that of Regan, see Francione, supra note 6, at xxxiiBxxxiv, 94 n.25, 127B28 n.61, 148 n.36, 174 n.1. animals seriously, we have already decided that the principle of equal consideration does not apply to animals and that animals are things that have no morally significant interests.
Because animals are property, we treat every issue concerning their use or treatment as though it presented a genuine conflict of interests, and invariably we choose the human interest over the animal interest even when animal suffering can be justified only by human convenience, amusement, or pleasure. In the overwhelming number of instances in which we evaluate our moral obligations to animals, however, there is no true conflict. When we contemplate whether to eat a hamburger, buy a fur coat, or attend a rodeo, we do not confront any sort of conflict worthy of serious moral consideration. If we take animal interests seriously, we must desist from manufacturing such conflicts, which can only be constructed in the first place by ignoring the principle of equal consideration and by making an arbitrary decision to use animals in ways in which we rightly decline to use any human.
Does the use of animals in experiments involve a genuine conflict between human and animal interests? Even if a need for animals in research exists, the conflict between humans and animals in this context is no more genuine than a conflict between humans suffering from a disease and other humans we might use in experiments to find a cure for that disease. Data gained from experiments with animals require extrapolation to humans in order to be useful at all, and extrapolation is an inexact science under the best of circumstances. If we want data that will be useful in finding cures for human diseases, we would be better advised to use humans. We do not allow humans to be used as we do laboratory animals, and we do not think that there is any sort of conflict between those who are afflicted or who may become afflicted with a disease and those humans whose use might help find a cure for that disease. We regard all humans as part of the moral community, and although we may not treat all humans in the same way, we recognize that membership in the moral community at the very least precludes such use of humans. Animals have no characteristic that justifies our use of them in experiments that is not shared by some group of humans; because we regard some animals as laboratory tools yet think it inappropriate to treat any humans in this way, we manufacture a conflict, ignoring the principle of equal consideration and treating similar cases in a dissimilar way.
There may, of course, be situations in which we are confronted with a true emergency, such as the burning house that contains an animal and a human, where we have time to save only one. Such emergency situations require what are, in the end, decisions that are arbitrary and not amenable to satisfying general principles of conduct. Yet even if we would always choose to save the human over the animal in such situations, it does not follow that animals are merely resources that we may use for our purposes. 99 We would draw no such conclusion when making a choice between two humans. Imagine that two humans are in the burning house. One is a young child; the other is an old adult, who, barring the present conflagration, will soon die of natural causes anyway. If we decide to save the child for the simple reason that she has not yet lived her life, we would not conclude that it is morally acceptable to enslave old people, or to use them for target practice. Similarly, assume that a wild animal is just about to attack a friend. Our choice to kill the animal in order to save the friend=s life does not mean that it is morally acceptable to kill animals for food, any more than our moral justification in killing a deranged human about to kill our friend would serve to justify our using deranged humans as forced organ donors.
In sum, if we take animal interests seriously, we are not obliged to regard animals as the same as humans for all purposes any more than we regard all humans as being the same for all purposes; nor do we have to accord to animals all or most of the rights that we accord to humans. We may still choose the human over the animal in cases of genuine conflictCwhen it is truly necessary to do soCbut that does not mean that we are justified in treating animals as resources 99 . A common argument made against the animal rights position is that it is acceptable to treat animals as things because we are justified in choosing humans over animals in situations of conflict. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, "Animal Rights," Slate Dialogues, at http://slate.msn.com/id/110101/entry/110129/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
for human use. 100 And if the treatment of animals as resources cannot be justified, then we should abolish the institutionalized exploitation of animals. We should care for domestic animals presently alive, but we should bring no more into existence. The abolition of animal exploitation could not, as a realistic matter, be imposed legally unless and until a significant portion of us took animal interests seriously. Our moral compass will not find animals while they are lying on our plates. In other words, we have to put our vegetables where our mouths are and start acting on the moral principles that we profess to accept.
If we stopped treating animals as resources, the only remaining humananimal conflicts would involve animals in the wild. Deer may nibble our ornamental shrubs; rabbits may eat the vegetables we grow. The occasional wild animal may attack us. In such situations, we should, despite the difficulty inherent in making interspecies comparisons, try our best to apply the principle of equal consideration and to treat similar interests in a similar way. This will generally require at the very least a good-faith effort to avoid the intentional killing of animals to resolve these conflicts, where lethal means would be prohibited if the conflicts involved only humans. I am, however, not suggesting that the recognition that animal interests have moral significance requires that a motorist who unintentionally strikes an animal be prosecuted for an animal equivalent of manslaughter. Nor do I suggest that we should recognize a cause of action allowing a cow to sue the farmer. The interesting question is why we have the cow here in the first instance.
100. The choice of humans over animals in situations of genuine emergency or conflict does not necessarily represent speciesism because there are many reasons other than species bias that can account for the choice. See Francione, supra note 6, at 159B62.
